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Economics

How Does the Thai Million Baht Village Fund Impact Fertility in Thailand?
Chairperson: Douglas Dalenberg
This study evaluates the impact of Thailand’s Million Baht Village Fund program on
household fertility decisions. Thailand’s fertility rates are alarmingly low and it is
imperative to recognize the unintended consequences a microfinance program may have
on fertility choices within Thailand. Using panel data from pre- and post-program years,
this research identifies the change in number of babies in a household associated with
getting a microloan from the Village Fund program. The quasi-experimental nature of the
program and an instrumental variable model with fixed effects identifies a negative
relationship between the number of babies within families and participation in the
microfinance program. Although the impact is statistically significant, the decrease in
babies due to participation is not of practical significance.
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1 Introduction
Microfinance programs are an important part of financial intermediation in
developing countries. They help connect potential borrowers with small loans, especially
in poor and rural areas. This research focuses on a government-funded microfinance
program in Thailand. This program, Thailand’s Million Baht Village Fund, has a few
qualities that give it a degree of exogeneity where most microfinance programs are
endogenous and makes measuring the impacts of the funds difficult.
All Thai villages were eligible for the microfinance program and had to submit an
application and form a village committee to be accepted. The program introduced funds
into 77,000 diverse Thai villages accepted into the program. Each village received a
transfer of one million baht (about $25,000),1 which was used to provide village members
with small loans.
One aspect of the program that gave it a degree of exogeneity was its surprise
onset after a quick dissolution of one political party and the rise to power of another. The
second is the uniform amount distributed to each village. I will discuss these two
elements in more depth in Section 3.2.
To clearly understand if a microfinance program is a useful and efficient
utilization of development funds, it is crucial to understand how these injections of credit
are impacting the households, villages and larger economies exposed to them.
Development economists are often focused on concrete and obvious determinants of a
country’s development. There is a plethora of research on how different development
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policies and tools impact GDP, income per capita, and household consumption. These
studies answer the question of how development tools, like a microfinance program,
impact financial factors of development, but overlook the importance of other key
features of a developed country.
Fertility rates are one such determinant of development. It is widely accepted that
as countries develop, fertility rates drop. My research looks at the impact of The Million
Baht Village Fund, on fertility in Thailand. While many less developed countries have
high fertility rates, Thailand is experiencing abnormally low fertility rates. With a fertility
rate below the replacement rate,2 this means the Thai people are not having enough
babies each year to maintain their population levels. This might not seem like an
immediate problem, but prolonged years with a fertility rate below replacement rate (2.1
births per woman) can results in serious labor shortages and adverse economic
consequences.
Little research exists on the impacts of microfinance programs on fertility
(Kuchler 2012; Banjeree et al. 2015). My findings could help guide efficient
development policy decisions in Thailand and other developing countries. The sign and
significance of the impact of a microfinance program on fertility is important in Thailand.
If the unintended consequences of a microfinance program have a negative and
significant influence on fertility in a country with existing low fertility rates, then a
microfinance program needs further consideration before it is implemented. By using 11
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rate was 1.5 births per woman in 2014 (http://data.worldbank.org).
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years of panel data along with a combination of an instrumental variable and fixed
effects, I hope to add to the existing literature.
My results show getting a microloan does decrease the number of children a
household has, but the amount by which it decreases is insignificant in practical terms. A
country should be aware that a microfinance program could cause decreases in fertility
rates, but unless the influx of funds is massive, the decrease will not be substantial. The
policy implications of these findings suggest that to avoid decreases in fertility a
microfinance program should be accompanied by other policies that combat decreased
fertility. In the case of Thailand, the other benefits of microfinance easily outweigh the
small and insignificant cost.

2 Literature Review
2.1 Microfinance
In the past 25 years, micro lending has become one of the most significant
development policy tools. Lack of access to credit is arguably one of the main reasons
people in developing countries have difficulty escaping poverty. Studies have shown that
access to credit can increase productivity and quality of life in lower-income households
(Khandker 1998). Without a loan from a formal or informal institution, many people find
it impossible to save the funds to start or expand a business or get an education, which
may raise their chances of climbing out of poverty. Whether they want to invest in a
business opportunity or increase the potential of their own human capital, these
endeavors can require a substantial amount of initial funds. Gathering initial funds is a
barrier to people who don't have access to financial institutions. Poorer people in
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developing countries typically have less access to loans because they do not have the
necessary collateral to put up for a loan from a bank. Another problem facing a poor
individual is that the bank’s cost of monitoring and screening a poor borrower is too high
for it to be a profitable loan for the bank (Hermes and Lensink 2007).
Microfinance programs are a useful way to inject funds into the local economies
of developing countries. KIVA, which means “unity” in Swahili, is a non-profit
organization based out of San Francisco that exemplifies the microfinance ideology of a
“hand up instead of a handout.” The organization collects short biographies on
individuals or groups from around the world who are looking for a microloan. People
donate to KIVA and choose which group or person receives their funds. An example is
Lila, a 43-year-old from Alipurduar, India, who needs $475 to help her buy a cow so she
can produce milk, butter and other products to sell. At some point the borrower repays
the money and the donor picks another person to whom to lend. The program started in
2005 and so far has spread to 82 countries and lent out $938.3 million with a 97 percent
repayment rate.3 Their goal is to help one person in a community, for example, start a
business, which will have a ripple effect of positive impacts on other people in that
community.
Numerous models exist for microfinance programs. One of the most prevalent
models is group-based lending. The Grameen Bank, in Bangladesh, has a system where
five people form a group and each receives a loan. If one member of the group defaults
on their personal loan, the whole group will no longer be eligible for loans (Khandker and
Pitt 1998). The Thai Village Fund program operates similarly. Funds are given to a
3
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village committee that then lends money to village members. Receiving funds for the
credit program in subsequent years is dependent on the village’s successful repayment of
the members’ loans (Kaboski and Townsend 2011). Group-based credit programs
incentivize people to monitor and assist other members in the group instead of using
collateral as most bank loan models do. Group-based lending is especially useful for poor
households that would not have collateral to get a loan (Khandker and Pitt 1998).
Although KIVA and other programs boast the positive impacts of microloans,
there is a substantial amount of research about whether micro lending is an effective
development tool. Gaonkar and Henriques (2011) find that poor people are more likely to
use a micro loan for productive and income-generating activities than wealthier
individuals. This evidence suggests that micro lending is a positive development tool.
However, there is controversy over the effectiveness of microloans. Ahlin and Jiang
(2008) state the theoretical framework for microfinance success hinges on the rate at
which self-employed microfinance participants “graduate” from small-scale operations to
full-scale. They find that although loans do tend to lower inequality and poverty, in the
long run, they can either raise or lower GDP.
A wide area of study looks at microloans given to low–income households.
Evidence from Bangladesh suggests that access to microloans have substantial positive
effects for the poorest people (Khandker 2005). Using data from 1991/92 and 1998/99 in
Bangladesh, Khandker (2005) finds microfinance accounts for about half of the 3percentage-point annual reduction in poverty among program participants. Studies of
government microfinance programs in Thailand show the effects of a microloan program
on expenditure and incomes are quite large for low-income households. Most borrowers
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were poor and from the agricultural sector (Boonperm et al. 2013). These results support
the idea that microfinance programs successfully target the poor. Looking at two years of
panel data of rural households from the Thailand Socioeconomic Survey, Boonperm et al.
(2013) used a fixed-effects model and found borrowing from the Million Baht Village
Fund is associated with a 3.5 percent increase in current spending and 1.4 percent more
income. Using nationwide data from 2004, Boonperm et al. (2013) found similar results
using a propensity score matching model and additionally found that Village Fund loans
are associated with purchasing of more durable goods.
The real effects of microloans are unclear. Evaluating the impacts of a
microfinance program started in 2006 in Morocco, researchers find that microcredit is a
valuable financial instrument for the poor, but self-employment investments do not result
in an exit from poverty within two years of receiving the loan (Crepon et al. 2015).
Similarly, a randomized control trial in Ethiopia between 2003 and 2006 found that three
years after the implementation of a microfinance program the fraction of households with
loans increased 25 percentage points when compared to control areas (Desai et al. 2015).
Despite this significant increase in the number of households receiving loans, there was
no clear evidence of widespread improvement in socioeconomic indicators, such as
income-generating activities, livestock ownership or schooling. The influx in borrowing
was not associated with more non-farm business creation.
Most of the current studies of microfinance programs focus on the impacts the
programs have on economic outcomes like income, consumption and GDP (Ahlin and
Jiang 2008; Banerjee et al. 2015; Boonperm et al. 2013). To decide if microfinance
programs are effective development tools, it is important to look at other dimensions of
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development, like subjective well-being, empowerment and fertility. This research will
focus on fertility.

2.2 Fertility and Development
Fertility rates are seen as a key indicator for a country’s development level. As a
country develops, its fertility rates tend to decrease. Several factors of development can
impact fertility and result in this negative correlation between development and fertility
rates. More developed countries compared to less developed ones have better and more
access to health care. More accessible health care lowers infant mortality rates (Gruber et
al. 2014). If a family expects more of their children to survive, they might have fewer
children, lowering fertility rates in a country.
Another possibility is that a developing country moves away from agricultural
economies to a more industrialized economy. This can affect fertility in two ways. One
being the availability of industry jobs might increase the opportunity costs of staying at
home and bearing children. The other way is that families that focus on agricultural work
might choose to have more children so they have more help on the farm. If they move
away from agriculture, they might have fewer children because they do not need as much
help with labor in the home. Cross-sectional evidence from Egypt supports this
hypothesis by looking at a farmer’s land share of specific crops and resulting fertility
changes (Levy 1985). Cotton is a crop that has a high demand for child labor, and Levy
(1985) finds a 10 percent increase in cotton’s land share results in a 1.5 percent increase
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in fertility. These findings suggest that the usefulness of children as laborers directly
influences a farming household’s fertility decisions.
As a country develops, its populace might decide to invest in their human capital
by getting an education. If a woman has to choose between going to school and having a
child, she might decide to delay childbearing. With the assumption that lower infant
mortality rates, industrialization, and increased education are all characteristics of a
developing country, I have shown how fertility can also be viewed as an indicator for a
country’s development. This suggests that developing countries might have a goal of
lower fertility rates. But, issues can arise if a country’s fertility rates drop too low.
2.3 Fertility in Thailand
In the early 1960s, Thailand reached a total fertility rate of about 6.5 births per
woman. High fertility was encouraged by government policy, which provided incentives
for early marriage and bonuses for large families (Mithranon and Prachuabmoh 2003).
Around the same time, governments and policy planners became concerned with the
consequences rapid population growth due to high fertility would have on economic
development. As a result, the Thai government formulated strategies to combat these
fears. By the 1970s, government concerns about high population growth resulted in the
implementation of an official population policy and the National Family Planning
Program, which provided contraception and other services, aimed at lowering fertility
and population growth.

8

Figure 1

Fertility declined steadily. According to the World Bank,4 by 2010, total fertility
rates in Thailand had dropped to about 1.5 births per woman, with slight variation among
the regions within Thailand. This fertility rate is below the replacement level, which is
generally accepted to be about 2.1 children per woman. Thailand’s decline in fertility
rates is one of the quickest among newly industrializing Asian economies (Mithranon and
Prachuabmoh 2003). With such a low fertility rate, Thailand faces new challenges and
concerns regarding population policy, such as an aging population and impending labor
shortages.

4
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2.4 Microfinance Programs and Fertility
With low fertility issues, it is important to understand how a microfinance
program might affect the number of children a household decides to have. The key
behind how this microfinance program will impact fertility is whether children are
normal or inferior goods.5 As income increases, consumption of normal goods increases.
The amount consumed of an inferior good decreases as income increases. So, if
household income increases and the household consequently has more children, then
children are a normal good.
An increase in credit increases the value of a woman’s time. Increased value of
time can result in positive or negative changes in the demand for children. The income
effect applies when the increase in income causes an increase in demand for children,
assuming the cost of having children remains constant. On the other hand, the increased
value of a woman’s time increases the opportunity cost of having a child and results in
the substitution effect (Pitt 1999).
Research shows that, generally, there is a negative correlation between income
and family size (Lindo 2010). These findings suggest that children are inferior goods and
that as households make more money they substitute away from having children. Figure 2
supports this idea by showing women in higher-income countries have fewer children.

5

I am using specific economic language when referring to children as normal or inferior goods and
observing how the number of children changes with an income shock.

10

Figure 2

These results are inconsistent with the assumption of consumer choice theory
models, which suggest children are normal goods because as households make more
money they can afford the costs associated with more children (Lindo 2010). There are
deeper underlying issues aside from solely the costs associated with having children that
make this consumer choice theory model a poor representation of child-bearing decisions.
For example, as income level rises, people may become more concerned with the quality
rather than quantity of children.
Developed countries, which usually have higher income levels, tend to have a
lower fertility rate than developing countries (Figure 2), suggesting that fertility reduction

11

might be a desired goal for development policies, such as a microfinance program
(Kuchler 2012). There are several ways a microfinance program could impact fertility
decisions.
One example is increasing the opportunity costs for women to have children. The
economic theory of fertility suggests if you increase access to credit, you increase
opportunities for women and therefore their time becomes more valuable (Kuchler 2012).
When a woman has access to credit and can get a loan to start a new business or invest in
something, with every child she decides to have, she is forgoing the potential job
opportunities. Forgone opportunities increase the opportunity costs of having children
and theoretically should decrease fertility as women choose to pursue other options. This
inverse relationship between opportunity costs and demand for children is seen in several
studies of the relationship between education and fertility (Long and Osili 2008; Kim
2010). Long and Osili (2008) find that using grant funds to increase a female’s education
by one year reduces the fertility rates of young women in Nigeria by raising the
opportunity costs of child bearing for young women. Kim (2010) points out that this
inverse relationship between education and fertility could be due to the fact that women
with higher educations have a better ability to adapt quickly to new contraceptive
technology. There is a link between education and ability to utilize new contraceptive
technology. Nevertheless, it is doubtful that an added year of high school-level education
could cause the impacts Long and Osili (2008) found in Nigeria if increased opportunity
costs are not also responsible for the change.
Pitt (1999) suggests a model of demand for children with the presence of
microfinance programs. His theory states that the degree to which the demand for

12

children is influenced by microfinance participation is directly dependent on the type of
self-employment opportunities available. If there are opportunities that are not labor
intensive and allow women to work at or near home, then the income effect is likely to be
dominant and demand for children would increase. But, if child-bearing and selfemployment opportunities are not compatible, then the substitution effect would
dominate and people would decide to work instead of having more children (Pitt 1999).
In Bangladesh, Pitt found fertility increases with the degree of female participation, but
fertility fell with male participation in microfinance programs. His explanation for these
results is that the women were able to work in the home or near the home and the income
effect was dominant. Pitt suggests fertility fell with male participation due to social
development programs, including encouragement within the Grameen Bank to keep
families small (Pitt 1999).
Amin et al. (1995) studied three microfinance programs in Bangladesh, including
the Grameen Bank, and found alternative results. Using a 1992 national household
sample, the researchers found that poor female recipients of microloans who were
engaged in income-generating activities experienced a decreased level of fertility,
decrease in desire for more children and increase in contraceptive use. Although, these
results show a decrease in fertility, it supports Pitt’s (1999) idea that the opportunities
available to a woman are going to determine the change in fertility.
Lindo (2010) found supporting results with panel data from the United States
using a logit model and a linear probability model. The results show that a family reacts
to an income shock, in the form of a husband's job loss, by having more children in the
timeframe immediately after the shock. There are two possible explanations for this. In a
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dynamic fertility model, credit-constrained households have an incentive to delay having
a child until the husband earns more. When they lose their job, and the earnings trajectory
is significantly reduced, households have less of an incentive to delay having children
(Lindo 2010). Another explanation is that a husband losing his job might be seen as a
convenient opportunity to have a child because they have more free time to allocate to the
task of raising a child (Lindo 2010). This supports Pitt's findings of the relationship
between male participation and fertility.
Thailand is a unique case. Women in Thailand are significantly more involved in
major decision making and controlling household assets and finances than women in
other developing countries. They also seem to have higher ambitions for career
advancement (Mithranon and Prachuabmoh 2003). The unusual paradigm in Thailand,
might suggest that women in Thailand are exceptionally vulnerable to the increases in
opportunity costs due to a microfinance program. But, as Pitt (1999) suggested, if the
informal economy is large in Thailand, it is possible the income effect will take over and
women will choose to have more children.
2.5 Contribution to Existing Literature
The current research has some weaknesses where my study uses a longer panel
and a different method that might offer more reliable results. Kuchler (2012) argues that
his research is one of the first to utilize a panel dataset to look at this question and uses
two years of panel data. Similarly, Boonperm et al. (2013) uses two years of panel data
to study how microfinance programs change income and spending in Thailand. Panel
data helps overcome the self-selection biases that plague nearly all microfinance
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programs. This self-selection bias stems from the nature of microfinance programs.
People choose to take out a loan rather than getting randomly assigned to a loan. Selfselection creates a bias because there might be certain characteristics about a person that
makes them more likely to participate in a microfinance program and it is possible those
characteristics could also impact key variables. Panel data sets allow researchers to
employ useful econometric tools, like difference-in-differences and fixed effects to
remove or reduce the bias (Tedeschi 2008). By using 11 years of panel data, my study of
Thailand may be able to report impacts that Kuchler's (2012) study in Bangladesh and
Boonperm et al. (2013) missed with more limited data. Another weakness of the data
used by Boonperm et al. (2013) is the absence of pre-program data. To fully understand
the impacts of the program, it is beneficial to have information before and after the
implementation of the microfinance program. This allows you to use the pre-program
years as a base and compare them with the post-program years to identify the impacts of
the program. The data I am using covers five years before the program and six years after
the program.
Kuchler's (2012) study uses an eligibility requirement within the microfinance
program that allows participation only from those who own less than 1/2 acre of land.
Kuchler argues that a comparison among villages that did and did not participate could
cause differences in results because of non-random program placement. For example, a
microfinance program might be more likely in poor or rural communities. A fixed effects
and difference-in-difference model compares the differences between eligible households
(less than ½ acre of land) and ineligible households (more than ½ acre of land) with the
differences between eligible and ineligible households in nonparticipating villages. He
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finds that access to a microfinance programs does not have a significant impact on
fertility, but finds fertility decreases with degree of participation, which could point to
impacts in the long run (Kuchler 2012).
Kuchler (2012) cites two working papers that outline an important distinction in
microfinance literature. Many microfinance programs include contraceptive knowledge
and dispersion. Borrowers from the Grameen Bank have to recite the “sixteen decisions”
at every meeting; one being “we shall plan to keep our family small” (Kuchler 2012).
Buttenheim (2006) studies the relationship between microfinance programs and
contraceptive use. The study in Indonesia finds higher contraceptive use in areas exposed
to microfinance, but actually borrowing from the program does not have an impact. In a
related study, Sukontamarn (2006) finds the presence of the Grameen Bank in the village
of the observed individual is associated with lower fertility and lower desired number of
children. These results suggest that there is an important distinction between access to a
microfinance program and participation in the program.
The scope of the Thai Million Baht Village Fund and the strength of an
instrumental variable will allow me to fill a gap in the literature and possibly find results
different from Kuchler's (2012) findings. Lindo (2010) found that the best way to
understand the causal impact of a family’s income on fertility would be to create an
experiment where a household is randomly assigned to an income level. In the absence of
such experiments, the next best alternative is to find something that randomly adds or
takes away from a household’s income. The sudden implementation of the Village Fund
and its quasi-experimental nature allows me to look at it as an income shock.

16

3 Thailand
Thailand is a country located in Southeast Asia. Formerly known as Siam until
1939, Thailand is the only country in Southeast Asia to never be colonized by a European
power. Its total area is roughly 198,000 square miles and has a population around 68
million people. 6
Figure 3

6

Information about the history and economy of Thailand taken from the CIA World Factbook
(https://www.cia.gov)
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Thailand’s main industries include tourism, textiles and agriculture. Thirty-two
percent of the labor force’s occupation is agricultural. Thailand is currently experiencing
a labor shortage and has the fourth lowest unemployment rate in the world at 0.9 percent.
This may amplify the importance of identifying the impacts of increased microfinance on
fertility rates, because decreases in fertility rates will contribute to exacerbating
Thailand’s labor shortage.
Thailand is controlled by a constitutional monarchy. In November 2000, the Thai
Parliament was dissolved and by January 2001 the new Prime Minister, Thaksin
Shinawatra, was in control (Kaboski and Townsend 2012). While running for Prime
Minister, Thaksin Shinawatra promised government programs aimed at helping the
people of Thailand. Some of the programs he planned to implement were affordable
health care, a microfinance program and a debt moratorium for farmers. Many Thai
people did not believe these programs would come to fruition, and surprised the Thai
citizen when it was actually implemented. The rapid arrival of the program contributed
to the unexpected nature of the microfinance program and gave it a quasi-experimental
quality because people did not have time to alter their decisions in anticipation of these
programs. Shortly after Thaksin’s election, the microfinance program was started and the
funds were distributed to the villages between 2001 and 2002.
3.1 Million Baht Village Fund
In 2001, Thailand implemented a microfinance program that provided funds to
every village to create community-level lending organizations. The goal of the program
was to create a way for communities to have a self-sustaining fund that would aid in
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occupational development and income-generating activities. This program, Thailand’s
Million Baht Village Fund, is among the largest microfinance programs in the world. The
program distributed approximately $1.8 billion in initial funds, about 1.5 percent of
Thailand's GDP for 2001. This influx of funds was distributed to 77,000 Thai villages;
each received roughly $25,000 (Kaboski and Townsend 2012). Two features of the
Million Baht Village Fund gave the influx of funds a degree of exogeniety.
One of the key features of the Thai Village Fund is the surprise onset. People did
not have time to alter their decision-making in anticipation of the program; therefore, we
can assume that we can capture the impacts of the Village Fund after its implementation.
An example of how this works is that if the population of a country anticipates a huge
influx of credit in the next few years, they may alter their decisions leading up to the
programs implementation. Altered decision-making before the official introduction of the
program would make it difficult to identify the true impacts of the program because the
impacts would not be seen when comparing pre-program and post-program years.
Additionally, a comparison of before and after people knew about it would be necessary.
The second is the wide variation in the concentration of credit injection among villages
because each village received the same amount regardless of village size. Smaller
villages had relatively stronger injections of credit than larger villages. Variation in
relative injection strength acts as a natural way to identify the amount of credit received
in each village.
To receive the funds, villages had to form committees and submit applications.
Committee members were selected democratically with some regulations in place for
fairness. The regulations required that 75 percent of village members be present at the
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meeting to select committee members, half of the members had to be women, and
members must be over 20 years old and have lived in the village for at least two years.
They could not be bankrupt or previously imprisoned, and each member could only serve
on the committee for two years (Kaboski and Townsend 2012).
The funds were given to the villages with a few ultimatums. The government told
villages that if they mismanaged the funds or the village institutions failed, they would
not be given any more funds and other sources of government funding would be cut off.
Villages that did particularly well were promised additional funds. In 2005, funds with
the highest rating were granted an additional 100,000 baht ($2,500 US) (De La Huerta
Barradas 2011).
The villages received sample Village Fund regulations, which gave them idea of
how to structure their lending program. While some villages decided to use the sample
structure, other villages misunderstood this to be a requirement, which resulted in many
of the funds being very similar. The fund usually allotted 900,000 baht ($22,500 US) for
regular lending and set aside 100,000 baht ($2,500 US) for emergency lending (Kaboski
and Townsend 2012). Loans could not exceed 20,000 baht ($500 US) without special
approval from all members of the fund. The repayment period for the loan could not be
longer than 12 months, with the emergency loans typically being shorter. They had to
charge a positive interest rate, but the Village Fund committee could set a standard rate,
on average 7 percent (Kaboski and Townsend 2012).
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3.2 Kaboski and Townsend
Kaboski and Townsend (2012) used panel data to determine how the Thai microfinance program affected consumption in local villages. Their research supported the
buffer stock savings model, which suggests that people save more, in the form of liquid
assets, in credit-constrained environments. They found that when credit constraints were
alleviated, consumption increased. Consumption specifically increased for household and
automotive repairs, meat and alcohol. Kaboski and Townsend (2011) use a structural
evaluation of the Thai Million Baht Village Fund and found similar results to their 2012
study. Although their research was thorough and evaluated impacts of credit on most
aspects of a village economy, they did not look at how it changed fertility in the villages.
Because each village in the Thai Million Baht Village Fund received the same
amount of funds from the program, smaller villages received a proportionally larger
injection of funds. Following Kaboski and Townsend (2012), using the inverse of village
population will provide me with a source of exogenous variation in access to credit. The
rapid implementation of the program meant that people did not know that the funds were
going to be available to them. This allows me to look at the loans as a sort of income
shock. Since there are factors within a household that are likely to influence both fertility
and income, this income shock via increased access to credit provided a degree of
exogeneity (Lindo 2010). The gaps in methodology within the literature on microfinance
programs and fertility along with a lack of analysis in Thailand create an opening for my
research to extend Kaboski and Townsend’s (2012) research to fertility.
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4 Data
The Thai Townsend dataset includes panel survey data of households, institutions
and village leaders in Thailand. Robert Townsend created this dataset to find a way to
track how households and individuals overcome financial challenges.7 My research will
focus on the household surveys from 1997-2007 and will also use parts of the survey of
village leaders. The unit of observation is the household. The dataset contains
information at the individual level, but each individual is recorded under a household ID.
Because of the way some of the variables were collected, it is necessary to look at the
variables at the household level rather than the individual level. The household level is
also essential because the individual level data does not specify fertility information and
without knowing what children belong to which individual I have to look at the number
of children in a household. There is usually a single head in a household, but it is
common for there to be non-nuclear households. It is impossible to accurately identify
who is a parent to whom.

7

https://mitpress.mit.edu/blog/townsend-thai-project
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Figure 48

Because Thailand is a diverse country with wide dissimilarities between urban
and rural areas, surveyors chose two separate regions to use: one relatively urban region
near Bangkok in central Thailand, and another poorer, less developed region in the
Northeast. They chose two changwats, or provinces, from each region: Lop Buri and
Chachoengsao were chosen from the Central region, and Sisaket and Buriram from the
Northeast. These specific changwats were chosen because each had a county that was

8

https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/th.html
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also part of the Thai Household Socio-Economic Survey, an annual survey that could be
used as a comparison. Twelve tambons, or sub-counties, in each changwat were
randomly selected using Geographic Information Systems. Four villages from each
tambon were randomly selected. There are 192 villages in the baseline survey. To
perform the surveys, enumerators were hired from Thai universities. The baseline survey
was the largest and included information from 2,880 households and 192 key informants
(village leaders).9

9

http://townsend-thai.mit.edu/
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Figure 5 10

10

http://townsend-thai.mit.edu/data/Timeline06252012.pdf
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The baseline survey was conducted in May 1997, right before the devaluation of
the Thai baht in July 1997 and the Asian Financial Crisis. The Townsend Thai Project
saw the Asian Financial Crisis as an opportunity to follow the impact of this economic
turmoil on households and institutions. In 1998, they randomly chose four of the 12
tambons to resurvey and one-third of the original participants to resurvey. The attrition
rate from year to year was about two percent (Kaboski and Townsend 2012) so, of the
960 households surveyed annually, 730 were included in the data I am using for all 11
years (1997-2007). In any panel survey, attrition is an important issue to be aware of.
Results can change if certain types of households are leaving the survey. If the leaving
households are randomly selected, it would not be an issue. But, it is possible that there
are certain qualities and characteristics that make a household more likely than others to
leave the annual survey. For the purpose of this research I assume that the households
that left the survey were random. For further research, it would be useful to identify any
similarities between households that left the survey.
This panel dataset has many strengths, including the detail of the survey and the
time period it spans. Along with taking place during a time of economic change, the data
also catches the impacts of the 2001 Thai Million Baht Village Fund, which sent an
influx of credit into village economies.
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Figure 6

As seen in Figure 6, the average amount borrowed from the Village Fund
increases drastically after the program’s implementation in 2001, and continues to
gradually increase in the years after. Table 1 shows that along with more money being
borrowed from the Village Fund, more households are borrowing from that source. In
2001, eight households had a loan from the village fund. By 2002, 448 households had a
Village Fund loan. This sharp influx of cash further supports the quasi-experimental
nature of the Thai Million Baht Village Fund due to its rapid onset. After 2001, Figure 7
indicates that households started to get more loans. The number of households with zero
to two loans decreased and the number of households with more than two loans
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increased. Figure 6 shows that although the Village Fund is not the main source of loans,
it makes up a significant proportion of the money borrowed in Thailand. This combined
with the visible impacts of the Village Fund in Table 1 and Figure 7 suggests it should
have significant impacts in my analysis.

Table 1

BAAC

Comm. Bank

Agr. Coop

Moneylender

Store Owner

Supplier

Landlord

Purchaser

Other

47

103

249

6

28

86

6

83

28

2

3

15

73

1998

5

84

185

242

8

20

98

11

100

66

43

2

12

89

1999

10

92

250

276

11

28

111

9

138

71

34

2

14

128

2000

11

66

239

282

11

25

109

4

133

55

29

1

10

161

2001

8

38

217

289

25

24

106

13

131

49

26

0

15

201

2002

448

37

188

289

43

22

105

7

117

55

16

0

15

325

2003

504

27

155

293

51

19

94

4

103

63

14

0

13

342

2004

490

25

121

293

62

14

103

4

93

85

10

0

15

339

2005

491

24

89

288

69

12

115

11

63

59

5

1

12

304

2006

490

21

51

302

78

12

92

7

45

73

8

0

1

270

2007

470

19

36

299

66

10

91

5

30

45

7

0

8

255

Rice Bank

Relative

8

PCG

Neighbor

1997

Year

Village Fund

Number of Households Receiving Each Loan Type by Year

Figure 7 shows the number of households that only have zero, one or two loans
decreases dramatically. The number of households that have three or more loans
increases. This change occurs between 2001 and 2002. The same years the Village Fund
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was introduced, suggesting households took on more loans after the introduction of the
Village Fund. These outcomes imply the Village Fund had a significant impact on
village borrowing.
Figure 7

My dependent variable is the number of children aged 0 to 2 in a household. This
variable tracks new births in a household. Most fertility studies use individual fertility
data and have data on whether a particular woman conceived a child during a certain year
(Lindo 2010). Household-level data is not as exact as individual-level data, but it will
still reveal the impacts of the Village Fund on household fertility. For my right-hand side
variables, I will be using information on household credit utilization, specifically how
much was borrowed from the Village Fund, along with how much they borrowed from
29

other sources. Household characteristics such as, number of adult males (>15), number of
children in age groups 2 to 15, number of women older than 15 and younger than 40,
number of women over 40 years old, whether the head’s primary occupation is farming,
and net income are important right-hand side variables. For the purpose of this paper, I
am defining women older than 15 and younger than 40 as women of childbearing age and
women over the age of 40 as other women.
(1)
13

6

𝑦𝑖,𝑡+1 = 𝛽0 + 𝛼𝑉𝐹𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽1 ∑ 𝐻𝑘,𝑖,𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑘 𝑋𝑘,𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜑𝑡 + 𝜑𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡
𝑘=1

𝑘=2

In Equation 1, 𝑦𝑖,𝑡+1 is my left-hand side variable, number of children in
household i in year t+1. 𝑉𝐹𝑖,𝑡 is the amount household i borrowed from the Village Fund
in year t. 𝑋𝑘,𝑖,𝑡 is a vector of the k household characteristics and 𝐻𝑘,𝑖,𝑡 is a sum of
household borrowing other than the Village Fund.
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Table 2

Variable Description
LHS Variable Name
Villagefund

Otherloans

Variable Label
Amount borrowed from Village Fund in
10,000 baht
Amount borrowed from other loan sources
in 10,000 baht

Netincome

Net income in 10,000 baht

Yngchild

Number of children under 2 years old

Otherchild

Number of other children age 2 to 15

Women_fert

Number of women >15 and <40 years old

Women_nonfert

Number of women >40 years old

Adultmale

Number of males >15 years old

Headfarm

Dummy for farmer head of household

Theory from existing literature helped me choose which variables to include in
my model. The number of adult males and women of childbearing age is apparent. If
there are more people in a household capable of reproducing then they will be more
babies. The number of older children is also important because the number of existing
children in a household might impact a household's decision to have an additional child.
By including other women, I am hoping to capture any possible effects grandparents or
other potential caregivers might have. My hypothesis is that a household with more
women over 40 could have more babies because these other women in the household
might be able to take some of the burden of childcare. Childcare help might influence a
household's decision making. Whether the head of the household is a farmer or not is
included in many similar studies (Kaboski and Townsend 2012) because farming families
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might have different child preferences from non-farming families. Table 3 shows
descriptive statistics of the key variables.

Table 3

Summary Statistics: Key Variables

Babies
Net Income
Other Loan Sources
Village Fund
Farmer Head
Other Children
Women >40
Women <40 (>15)
Adult Males

Mean
0.11
10.50
9.34
0.95
0.51
1.20
0.91
0.76
1.54

Std Dev
0.32
20.02
21.18
1.71
0.50
1.09
0.52
0.73
0.93

Min
0.00
-85.40
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

Max
3.00
626.80
523.20
26.00
1.00
7.00
3.00
5.00
8.00

Count
7280
7280
7280
7280
7280
7280
7280
7280
7280

Note. N= 7280 households.

In Table 3 and Table 5 the net income, other loan sources and Village Fund
variables are measured in 10,000 Thai baht. For the time period, 40 baht was about 1 US
dollar. So, the mean net income was about $2,600 (US dollars). Farmer head is a dummy
variable that indicates whether the head’s primary occupation was farming. This is an
important household characteristic to include. Theoretically, households that farm might
make different child-bearing decisions than households that do not farm. A farming
household might choose to have more children so they can have extra help with farming
duties.
The household credit utilization variables will also be important for my analysis.
There are many different borrowing sources in the data, but for my analysis I grouped
them into Village Fund and Other Loan Sources. The Village Fund is the main variable I
am interested in; therefore, I decided to group the others together. Although they are
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grouped together, it is important to understand what other borrowing sources are
available. The largest lending source is the Bank for Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives (BAAC), which is a government-owned bank that provides affordable credit
for agricultural producers. One of the smaller sources, the Production Credit Group
(PGC), is a community-level organization that helps promote good saving habits and
issues small loans to the local community. My study focuses on money borrowed from
the Village Fund, and including all of the sources a person borrows from is important
because the amount they borrow from one source might impact the amount they borrow
from another.

Table 4

Summary Statistics- Borrowing Characteristics

Village Fund
BAAC
Neighbor
Relative
PCG
Commercial Bank
Agricultural Coop
Rice Bank
Money Lender
Store Owner
Supplier
Landlord
Purchaser
Other

Mean
9,523.49
34,909.68
1,395.95
7,554.43
544.37
6,451.92
7,234.09
31.91
6,132.79
7,439.36
2,250.89
56.76
2,434.29
16,944.19

Std Dev
17,141.42
84,363.60
10,018.84
36,326.86
5,195.58
64,790.74
29,122.97
712.99
31,574.72
59,149.36
59,042.28
2,125.26
34,575.82
107,877.14

Min
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

Max
260,000
1,360,000
245,000
870,000
300,000
3,000,000
1,000,000
40,000
880,000
2,112,000
4,700,000
100,000
1,100,000
4,600,000

Notes. The loan amounts are measure in 1 baht. N= 7280 households

Due to the way the data was collected, I can only look at it at the household level
when looking at fertility. To be able to work with the data, I had to collapse the data to
the household level. So, the borrowing variables will tell me how much a household

33

borrowed from a loan source, but not which member borrowed the money. This is an
unfortunate but necessary loss of data.
Table 5 and Table 6 display the summary statistics of Village Fund borrowers and
non-Village Fund borrowers. Some variable means are very similar: babies, women of
childbearing age, adult males, other children. The means with the biggest difference are
net income and other funds. The mean net income for Village Fund borrowers was 11.57
(in 10,000 baht) and 9.95 (in 10,000 baht) for non-Village Fund borrowers. This shows
that households that borrowed from the Village Fund, on average, had 16,200 more baht
in net income ($405 US). The amount borrowed from other funds was also substantially
larger for Village Fund borrowers. On average, households that borrowed from the
Village Fund borrowed 53,100 more baht ($1,327 US) than households that did not
borrow from the Village Fund. This difference supports the idea that households that
borrow from other sources are more likely to also borrow from the Village Fund. There
are 421 households that only borrowed from the Village Fund.
Table 5

Summary Statistics: Village Fund Borrowers
Mean
Std Dev
Min
Max
Babies
0.11
0.32
0.00
2.00
Net Income
11.57
18.36
-41.67
354.74
Other Funds
12.85
26.99
0.00
523.20
Village Fund
2.81
1.86
0.05
26.00
Farmer Head
0.56
0.50
0.00
1.00
Other Children
1.21
1.08
0.00
6.00
Women >40
0.97
0.50
0.00
3.00
Women <40 (>15)
0.72
0.72
0.00
4.00
Adult Males
1.55
0.84
0.00
6.00
Note. Net income, other funds and Village Fund measured in 10,000 baht. N= 2495
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Table 6

Summary Statistics: Not Village Fund Borrowers
Mean
Std Dev
Min
Max
Babies
0.11
0.33
0.00
3.00
Net Income
9.95
20.80
-85.40
626.80
Other Funds
7.54
17.20
0.00
316.20
Village Fund
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
Farmer Head
0.49
0.50
0.00
1.00
Other Children
1.19
1.09
0.00
7.00
Women >40
0.88
0.52
0.00
3.00
Women <40 (>15)
0.79
0.74
0.00
5.00
Adult Males
1.54
0.97
0.00
8.00
Note. Net income, other funds and Village Fund measured in 10,000 baht. N= 4815
The other data I will use comes from a survey of village leaders. The important
variable I will include from this dataset is the number of households in each village for a
year. The mean number of households in a village is 170 with a standard deviation of 300
households. This variable will be crucial for my instrumental variable technique.
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Figure 8

A quick look into the data shows that the average size of a household is changing.
In Figure 8, it is evident that around 2000-2001, households started to get smaller. Using
the available data, I should be able to determine if this decrease is due to reduced fertility,
and whether this reduction in household size is a result of the sudden increase in available
credit. When attempting to identify causation, it is important to be aware of the
possibility of spurious results. A spurious relationship exists if available credit and
household size appear to have a linear correlation, but there is a lurking variable that
causes the two to decline and appear as if correlated.
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Figure 9

Figure 9 shows families with a Village Fund loan on average have more babies
than households with no loans or loans from other sources. However, other factors are not
controlled for, so there might be other aspects influencing these results. All of the lines
converge around 2006.

5 Methods
My methodological approach is taken from Kaboski and Townsend (2012), which
is the leading paper on the impacts of the Thai Million Baht Village Fund. A researcher
should use fixed-effects models to control for variation and some aspects of self37

selection. This model controls for unobserved heterogeneity that is constant across time
by using differencing, for example taking a first difference, which will remove timeinvariant components of the model. In this case, there are many household characteristics
that will also impact a household's specific fertility decisions. The Hausman test,
confirmed a fixed-effects model is the appropriate model to use rather than a randomeffects model (X2= 74.63, p< 0.001). Some advantages of a random-effects model are
more degrees of freedom and you can estimate coefficients for explanatory variables that
are constant over time, but in this instance, a random-effects model was not valid.
Using time-specific and household-specific fixed-effects models I can eliminate
unobserved variables that do not vary over time. Assuming fertility changes over time,
which initial results support, this should be an appropriate method. As in Kaboski and
Townsend (2012), Equation (2) is the specification for the impact of Village Fund credit
(VFi,t) of household i at time t on the outcome measure for fertility, yi,t+1.
(2)
13

6

𝑦𝑖,𝑡+1 = 𝛽0 + 𝛼𝑉𝐹𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽1 ∑ 𝐻𝑘,𝑖,𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑘 𝑋𝑘,𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜑𝑡 + 𝜑𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡
𝑘=1

𝑘=2

VFi,t measures how much household i borrowed from the Village Fund during year t. X
is a set of six household characteristics control variables. H is total borrowing from 13
other funds. There are also the time-specific fixed-effects (𝜑𝑡 ) and a household-specific
fixed-effect (𝜑𝑖 ). I chose to lead the dependent variable because it will take a minimum
of nine months to observe a child in the dataset. Assuming a child is the result of a loan,
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the loan occurs in year 1 while the child appears in year 2. Kaboski and Townsend (2012)
run multiple regressions, some with the lagged value of the Village Fund credit and
others using the current Village Fund credit. Because they are looking at consumption
and income, they do not have this biological nine-month delay to account for.
5.1 Instrumental Variable
Researchers use instrumental variables to solve the problem of endogenous
regressors, when explanatory variables are correlated with the error term. In this
situation, OLS will provide inconsistent estimators. Instrumental variables provide a way
to obtain consistent parameter estimates. This instrumental technique was used by
Kaboski and Townsend (2012). The instrument is the interaction of the inverse number
of households in the village and the post-program year dummies. Kaboski and Townsend
(2012) argue that program year and the number of households in a village are exogenous.
The number of households in a village is not connected to the number of babies, but the
number of households in a village will be connected to the amount of credit available to
each household in the Village Fund. The researchers restrict their research to villages
with 50 to 250 households and argue that the most important variation comes from these
small villages, but they also find their results are robust to including larger or smaller
villages. They find that the microfinance injections averaged 27 percent of income in the
smallest villages and less than 2.5 percent in the largest villages (Kaboski and Townsend
2012). The researchers do not clarify why they restricted their research to these sizes,
which excluded 9 of the 64 villages in the survey. In 2002, the number of households in
the excluded villages were: 30, 34, 268, 297, 305, 314, 400, 900 and 3194. Because
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Kaboski and Towsend’s (2012) results were robust to including all the villages I am using
all the available villages.
The instrumental variable of inverse village size affects the Village Fund credit
because it changes how much credit a household has access to. The instrumental variable
is necessary because the Village Fund was not randomly assigned or distributed. But, the
number of households in a village should not have an independent effect on individual
household fertility. If my assumptions are correct, this is a valid instrumental variable.

Figure 10
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Kaboski and Townsend (2012) use a two-stage least squares approach. By using
the interaction between the inverse number of households in the village and a dummy of
post-program year, it controls for variations across households correlated with the inverse
of village size and uses the additional effect of inverse number of households as the
instrument (Townsend and Kaboski 2012). One potential problem is that the number of
young children in a household might be correlated with the instrumental variable. The
reason I see a potential issue is that if a household has a child and then that might cause
part of the household to break off and form a new household. I anticipate the potential
increase in the number of households in a village due to having a child is minimal and
does not have a substantial impact on the validity of my instrumental variable. Figure 10
shows that there are not any significant changes in the average number of households in a
village. Since it stays fairly constant, I assume that this will not impact my instrumental
variable. This instrumental variable technique combined with the quasi-experimental
nature of the Thai Million Baht Village Fund and a panel dataset will allow me to make a
new contribution to the existing literature.

6 Results
This section discusses estimation results for the impact of a microfinance program
on number of young children a household has. Table 7 present the results of the various
models used for my estimation process with the IV model in column 3 being the most
relevant results.
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Table 7

Model Results
Dependent Variable =
Babies
Village Fund
Net Income
Other Children
Other Loan Sources
Women >40
Women <40 (>15)
Farmer Head
Adult Males
Constant
Year Fixed Effects
Household Fixed Effect
Number obs.
R2
Squared Correlation

(1)
OLS

(2)
OLS FE

(3)
IV FE

0.00013
[0.00334]
-0.00003
[0.00021]
-0.012***
[0.004]
-0.00030*
[0.00018]
0.021**
[0.009]
0.067***
[0.007]
0.008
[0.010]
0.022***
[0.005]
0.017
[0.017]
Yes

-0.00238
[0.00393]
0.00014
[0.00054]
-0.064***
[0.007]
0.00001
[0.00022]
0.017
[0.015]
0.040***
[0.011]
-0.017
[0.013]
0.015**
[0.007]
0.136***
[0.030]
Yes

-0.01605**
[0.00764]
0.00018
[0.00026]
-0.064***
[0.005]
0.00006
[0.00026]
0.020
[0.014]
0.039***
[0.008]
-0.017
[0.011]
0.016**
[0.007]
0.131***
[0.022]
Yes

No

Yes

Yes

7280
0.03

7280
0.03

7280
0.201

Notes.Coefficients are reported with standard errors in brackets. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the
1%, 5%, and 10% levels. Variables net income, Village Fund and other loan sources are measured in
10,000 Baht. Robust standard errors clustered on village ID for model 1 and model 2. Squared correlation
is the squared correlations between the left-hand side variable and predicted value.

Model 1 is a simple OLS regression. In the OLS regression the R2 is 0.03 and
Village Fund is not significant. Because there are certain characteristics about a
household that makes them more or less likely to get a loan or have more children, an
OLS regression will be affected by this omitted variable bias and have potential
inconsistent results.
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To address this issue, I need to use fixed or random effects. The Hausman test
uses the differences in the coefficients of fixed effects and random effects model to
decide if a random effects is the appropriate model to use. I reject the random effects
specification (X2 =26.08, p =0.037), so apply fixed effects. I added in household fixed
effects in Model 2. Fixed effects control for these unseen household characteristics that
do not change over time. The Village Fund coefficient is still insignificant, but now it is
negative.
It is important to include household fixed effects, but this does not solve the
endogeneity problem. There could be certain characteristics about a household that makes
them more likely to participate in the Village Fund program. To correct for this, I use an
instrumental variable, which helps give the Village Fund a degree of exogeneity. Model
3 is a combination of fixed effects and an instrumental variable. This model provides the
most reliable results.
The first stage results (Table 8) are useful for determining whether instrumental
variable approach is valid. The regression performs a weak identification test where the
H0 is the equation is weakly identified. With an F-statistic of 295.38 and a 5% relative
bias critical value of 18.37, I can reject that the max bias in 5% due to a weak instrument.
This means the maximum bias from a weak instrument is less than 5%.
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Table 8

IV Regression --- First Stage
Village Fund

Coef.

IV 2002

72.474***
[7.162]

IV 2003

146.399***
[7.515]

IV 2004

169.490***
[8.313]

IV 2005

204.990***
[8.188]

IV 2006

197.542***
[7.383]

Net Income

0.002***
[0.0009]

Other Children

0.017
[0.019]

Other Loan Sources

0.004***
[0.0009]

Farmer Head

0.093**
[0.037]

Women >40

0.224***
[0.046]

Women <40 (>15)

0.011
[0.026]

Adult Males

0.073**
[0.022]

Year Dummies

YES

Cragg- Donald Wald F statistic

295.38

5% relative bias

18.37
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Some of the results from Model 3 (Table 7) were unexpected. Contrary to what I
expected, net income was not statistically significant. To interpret the variable, it is
important to remember that it is measure in 10,000 baht. When changed into dollars, this
result shows that for every 100,000,000 baht ($2.5 million US dollar equivalent) increase
in net income, on average a family has 1.79 more children. This result is statistically and
practically insignificant and it is pointless to make any inferences from this result as to
children being a normal or inferior good.
Another result I found surprising was the farmer head coefficient. It is a dummy
variable indicator for whether the head of the household was a farmer or rancher.
Theoretically, I expected this result to be positive because the literature supports the idea
that agricultural families tend to have more children than non-farming families. Along
with the unexpected sign of this variable, it was also statistically insignificant. Being a
farmer rather than non-farmer was associated with 0.017 fewer children, all else constant.
Some results met my expectations. The number of other children in the
household aged 2 to 15 was significant to the 1 percent level. It was a count variable of
the number of other children in the household, so holding all else constant, for every
additional child in that age group, a household had 0.06 fewer babies, on average.
The number of women of childbearing age and adult males were both significant
results. The number of women of childbearing age is a count variable of the number of
women above the age of 15 and under 40 years old. Significant at the 1 percent level, for
every additional woman of childbearing age in a household, the household had 0.039
more babies. I would have been concerned with the validity of my model if the result
would have been negative and insignificant. If there are more women of childbearing age
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in a household, I expect that household has more babies. Similarly, I expected a positive
and significant result for the number of adult males in a household. For every additional
adult male in a household, the household had .015 more children, on average (significant
at the 5 percent level). Other women in a household had a positive but not statistically
significant. An additional woman above 40 years of age in a household was associated
with a 0.02 baby increase, all else constant.
The Village Fund variable was the main variable of interest. It negative and was
significant to the 5 percent level. This variable is measured in 10,000 baht. For every
additional 1,000,000 baht borrowed ($25,000 US dollar equivalent) a household had on
average, an additional 1.60 new children. While this result is statistically significant, it is
not practically significant because these loans are given in small amounts, typically under
20,000 baht ($500 US dollar equivalent). The other borrowing sources were not
statistically or practically significant. I believe this is due to the grouping of the loans
together. The BAAC is a substantial loan source and might have had significant impacts,
but when included with insignificant borrowing sources like rice banks and landlords, the
significance of the larger funds might have been overpowered by the insignificance of the
other loan sources. I will test a model where BAAC is a separate variable in my
robustness checks.
6.1 Robustness Check
Checking for robustness is an important way to examine core regression variables.
In my analysis, the Village Fund variable is my key right-hand side variable and to check
for robustness I modify my regression by including or excluding other variables.
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In Table 9, the results for Model 1 show that the Village Fund coefficient is not
significant. Poisson models are used when the dependent variable is a count and my
dependent variable is a count of how many babies are in a household. While it was useful
to run this regression and understand its benefits, it had one main weakness. With the
instrumental variable Poisson model I could not include household fixed effects. Instead,
I had to include regional-level fixed effects. Although, there might be reason to believe
that there are certain characteristics about a region that should be fixed, the loss of the
household-level fixed effects cannot be ignored. The coefficient is negative for all three
models, but because we are losing household fixed effects in the Poisson model with an
instrumental variable we are not efficiently estimating the coefficient. Model 2 (Table 9)
excludes households that have a head who identifies their primary occupation to be
farming. Model 3 keeps households only that have loans only from the Village Fund or
no loans at all. About 420 of the 1605 observations had a Village Fund loan. Village
Fund has a much larger constant in Model 2. When the sample was restricted to nonborrowers and Village Fund borrowers, participating in the Village Fund program had a
larger impact on number of babies in a household.
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Table 9

Robustness Checks
(1)
IV Poisson

(2)
No Farmers

(3)
No Loans or only
VF

-0.01688*
[0.00926]
-0.00033
[0.00032]
-0.05733***
[0.00811]
-0.00020
[0.00045]

-0.08872**
[0.04224]
0.00022
[0.00074]
-0.03730***
[0.01432]

Region Fixed Effects

-0.05553
[0.06479]
-0.00059
[0.00099]
-0.113***
[0.034]
-0.003
[0.002]
0.025
[0.076]
0.141**
[0.067]
0.511***
[0.037]
0.180***
[0.033]
-2.949***
[0.176]
Yes

Year Fixed Effects

Dependent Variable =
Babies
Village Fund
Net Income
Other Children
Other Loan Sources
Farmer Head

0.00574
[0.01845]
0.04368***
[0.01180]
0.01865*
[0.00994]
0.10431***
[0.03023]
No

-0.01877
[0.02461]
0.01276
[0.03066]
0.07636***
[0.01895]
0.02232
[0.01598]
-0.00009
[0.04664]
No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Household Fixed Effects
Number obs.

No
7280

Yes
3541

Yes
1605

Squared Correlation

0.026

0.297

0.357

Women >40
Women > 40 (>15)
Adult Males
Constant

Notes.Coefficients are reported with standard errors in brackets. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the
1%, 5%, and 10% levels. Variables net income, Village Fund and other loan sources are measured in
10,000 Baht. Model 2 drops out all households that have a head who is a farmer. Model 3 drops out all
households that received loans from sources other than Village Fund. Squared correlation is the squared
correlations between the left-hand side variable and predicted value.

Additional robustness checks confirm the approximate size and sign of the
Village Fund (Table 10). Model 1 (Table 10) displays how the results change when
limited to poor households (below the 25th percentile in net income). Model 2 (Table 10)
drops households that do not have children aged 2 to 15. The rational for this model, is
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the possibility that if households do not have other children, then they might not be able
to conceive. Model 5 separated the BAAC from other loan sources. A significant
proportion of loans come from the BAAC and it is useful to see its impacts. All the
models have relatively similar coefficients. The sign on the Village Fund coefficient is
the same and magnitude does not vary much.
Table 10

Robustness Checks 2
(1)
Low Net Income

(2)
Only Households w/ Children

(3)
BAAC Separate

-0.02249
[0.02415]
-0.001
[0.004]
-0.055***
[0.011]
0.0006
[0.0008]
-0.015
[0.029]
0.004
[0.017]
0.024
[0.014]
-0.004
[0.024]

-0.01493
[0.01079]
-0.0002
[0.0004]
-0.079***
[0.008]
0.00002
[0.00032]
0.024
[0.017]
0.019*
[0.010]
0.015*
[0.008]
-0.0004
[0.0138]

-0.01601**
[0.00763]
0.0002
[0.0003]
-0.063***
[0.006]

0.156***
[0.045]
Yes

0.227***
[0.029]
Yes

0.020
[0.014]
0.040***
[0.008]
0.016**
[0.007]
-0.017
[0.011]
0.00000004
[0.00000008]
0.000000002
[0.000000028]
0.130***
[0.022]
Yes

Year Fixed Effects
Number obs.

Yes
1906

Yes
5028

Yes
7280

Squared Correlation

0.383

0.234

0.201

Village Fund
Net Income
Other Children
Other Loans

(w/ BAAC)

Women >40
Women <40 (>15)
Adult Males
Farmer Head
BAAC
Other Loans (w/o BAAC)
Constant
Household Fixed
Effects

Notes.Coefficients are reported with standard errors in brackets. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the
1%, 5%, and 10% levels. Variables netincome, villagefund and othermfp are measured in 10,000 Baht.
Model 1 drops out households that had a net income above the 25 th percentile (31,500 baht). Model 2 only
keeps households that had at least one child aged 2 to 15. Model 3 separated out BAAC from other loan
sources. Squared correlation is the squared correlations between the left-hand side variable and predicted
value.
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7 Conclusion
The goal of this research was to identify how a microloan program impacted
household fertility decisions in Thailand. The empirical evidence suggests that getting a
microloan from the Thai Million Baht Village Fund had a negative impact on the number
of babies a household had. Although the result was statistically significant, a family
would have to borrow 1 million baht for the funds to result in 1.60 fewer babies. This
amount is far beyond what anyone could borrow and is therefore of practical
insignificance.
This result is important in the case of Thailand because of their unusually low
fertility rates. My results showed a miniscule impact in the number of babies in a
household after they borrowed from the Village Fund. The policy implications of this
suggest that using microfinance programs as a development tool in Thailand is a
beneficial use of development spending because it does not have a significant adverse
effect on the country’s fertility rates. If the results were practically significant, this would
suggest that Thailand would have to consider using other development tools that were not
going to decrease fertility rates even further, or coupling a microfinance program with
additional programs, like a childcare subsidy. This would lower the opportunity costs for
women of having a child.
It is important to note that the small effects of the microfinance program on
fertility might be due to the pre-existing trend of low fertility in Thailand. The fertility
rates in Thailand are 1.5 births per woman. This is very low relative to other countries
with only 27 countries having a lower fertility rate.11 There is a possibility that the

11

https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2127rank.html
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fertility rate cannot easily drop much below 1.5 births per woman and that is why I do not
see a significant impact of the microfinance program.
The impacts of microfinance on fertility are not typical areas of study. Most
literature focused on the changes in GDP, consumption and expenditure. There are
substantial issues associated with below replacement fertility. It results in labor shortages
and can have detrimental impacts on the economy. It was important to make sure that the
unintended negative impacts of the microfinance program on household fertility did not
outweigh the positive impacts on GDP and consumption.
There are a few potential issues to consider for the validity of this study. Attrition
is a serious issue if certain types of households were leaving the survey. For further
research, I would study the characteristics of these households to make sure there is not
any reason to believe their exit from the survey is impacting my results. Omitted variable
bias could also be having a harmful impact on my results. While it is nearly impossible to
correctly specify this type of model without some amount of omitted variable bias,
including more variables about household characteristics and village characteristics might
better identify the impact of the Village Fund on household fertility.
Along with correctly identifying the influential variables in a model, correctly
specifying the time frame can be a challenge. There is potential that the number of lags I
used was incorrect. I assumed the impacts of getting a loan would show up in the next
year’s data because most studies of income shocks and fertility look at the fertility
choices for the next year (Lindo 2010). Under my assumption, any fertility decisions that
are caused by a household getting a loan will happen within a few months of the loan and
then nine months later they have an additional child. Surveys were given annually in
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May. Based on when a household gets a loan in the survey cycle, a baby could show up
in the next year’s survey or it might take two years for the survey to capture the extra
child. It is possible that it would take longer for a microloan to impact fertility decisions
and a two or three year lag would be more appropriate. To address this issue, in addition
to leading my dependent variable, I included children ages 0 to 2 with the hopes that this
will solve for any timing issues.
One weakness of my research is the absence of specific fertility data. To complete
my research, I made certain assumptions to validate my dependent variable. One
assumption is that a child aged 0 to 2 is a child conceived by someone who also lives in
the same household. If I had individual-level fertility data, I could more accurately
identify the causal relationship between receiving a microloan and having a child.
The last issue is the access versus participation distinction that Buttenheim
(2006) and Sukontamarn (2006) discuss. If it truly is the access to a microfinance
program that results in changes to fertility decisions rather than actual participation, my
results could be incorrect. Every village in my sample has the Village Fund program, so
any changes due to solely having the program in the village would not be observable with
the data I used. For further research, it would be useful to find a data set that has villages
with and without the program and use villages without the program as a control.
Using an 11-year panel dataset from Thailand spanning pre and post-program
years, I assess how the Thai Million Baht Village Fund program influenced household
fertility. With a fixed-effects model and an instrumental variable technique I analyze the
changes in the number of new children in a household.
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Despite the aforementioned caveats, I find a negative impact of getting a Village
Fund microloan on fertility that is statistically significant but not practically significant.
This negative relationship supports much of the existing literature. This research is
especially important for Thailand because of their dangerously low fertility rates. My
findings do not suggest any immediate policy adjustments, but rather, rule out a potential
negative unintended consequence of microfinance in Thailand.
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